Commodity options and futures trading act of 2000 pdf


This week, a guest on the commodity options and futures trading act of 2000 pdf, lawyer John Martini, said the party ultimately responsible for this financial mess is Congress. We're joined by Michael Hirsh, who's written about this for Newsweek. But essentially, what happened is inin the spring of that year, Brooksley Born, who was then the chairwoman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, began to get increasingly worried about this market that was increasing in size and that was utterly unregulated by any government - derivatives, basically. How did it get passed? And they quashed it, in effect.

We've been talking with Michael Hirsch, senior editor of Newsweek. NPR transcripts are created on a rush deadline by Verb8tm, Inc. The point is that no one had any sense of systemic risk, which we've now learned, you know, is really the culprit - that the whole market could simply collapse all at once, and that's precisely what happened.

And she was really a Cassandra-like voice at the time. And AIG had the notion that it could sell these to everybody without hedging itself because somehow it would never all collapse at once. Well, let's talk about that, that law. This week, a guest on the program, lawyer John Martini, said the party ultimately responsible for this financial mess is Congress. How big was it?

And she developed a general proposal to begin the discussion of how to regulate the derivatives market. And they quashed it, in effect. Facebook Twitter Flipboard Email. Why don't you talk about this period leading up to the passage of this law inand what was going on at that time with the derivatives market?

She was predicting that, commodity options and futures trading act of 2000 pdf, really bad things could happen here if we're not paying attention. But it did have his imprimatur and the letter from the Treasury Department supporting, for the most part, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, as it was drafted, was used by Phil Gramm at the time as part of his campaign to help sell it. He was referring to a law Congress passed in December that prevented regulation of the market for derivatives, including credit default swaps. I mean, it was very interesting. And then in the subsequent months, what happened was the President's Working Group met again in November '99 and agreed that credit default swaps should go largely unregulated.

And that was influential in helping to pass the Commodity Futures Modernization Act a little over a year later, in late I mean, it was stuck in the middle of this 10,page authorization bill, and it happened very quickly. Summers, who had replaced Rubin, did give testimony in which he said very plainly that he thought swaps should be largely unregulated as derivatives. Well, let's talk about that, that law.

Thanks for coming in. This text may not be in its final form and may be updated or revised in the future. Did it take off?

Summers, who had replaced Rubin, did give testimony in which he said very plainly that he thought swaps should be largely unregulated as derivatives. Thanks for coming in. Melissa Block talks with Michael Hirsh, senior editor at Newsweek talks about how the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of was passed to keep financial derivatives, including credit default swaps, unregulated. Visit our website terms of use and permissions pages at www.

And she lost that clash of culture. Was anybody paying attention? What happened with the market?

There was, during this period, you know, from on up until the crash, a sense that this was helping everyone manage risk better. Was anybody paying attention? She was predicting that, look, really bad things could happen here if we're not paying attention. Melissa Block talks with Michael Hirsh, senior editor at Newsweek talks about how the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of was passed to keep financial derivatives, including credit default swaps, unregulated.